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CASE NOTES
at any rate, the Court should leave to Congress the determination whether to
make special exceptions to the antitrust laws for the special circumstances of
the music industry.49
 The case raises also the question of the extent to which
unions and employers may justify their anticompetitive schemes on the ground
that they directly benefit the employee union members. Carroll has confused
the once clear distinctions between an employer and his employees with such
concepts as "labor group work" and by division of the employer's functions.
The great expansion of "legitimate union interest" by Carroll seems unjusti-
fied in light of the extensive economic power already possessed by unions
such as the AFM. A single union in an industry such as music possesses a
great deal of bargaining power because of the diversified nature of the man-
agement with which it must deal. The musicians' union "exercises rigid and
monolithic control over much of the music industry," 50 and does not need
control of the management prerogative of price setting to protect its interests.
Secondly, Carroll seems to defeat the purpose of the NLRA to promote
collective bargaining by denying the full-time leaders their appropriate
status as employers and by allowing the union unilaterally to impose job
conditions without collective bargaining. The whole thrust of both Oliver
and Jewel Tea was that the union has a right to protect its members' interests
by restrictions determined through collective bargaining. But neither case
suggests that unions may restrain competition by refusal to bargain collec-
tively, by coercion of employers into the union and consequent imposition of
anticompetitive conditions through unilaterally adopted bylaws and regula-
tions. As the dissent stated, "The Court treads dangerous ground in seeking
on its own motion to deny to a particular industry the normal competitive
conditions envisioned by the antitrust laws, conditions usually viewed as
essential for maintaining services and prices at satisfactory levels." 51
DOUGLAS K. MAGARY
Bankruptcy Law—Bankruptcy Act—Section 77—Jurisdiction of Bank-
ruptcy Court Over State's Right of Eminent Domain.—Commonwealth v.
Bartlett. 1—The Boston & Providence Railroad had been undergoing re-
organization 2
 proceedings in the District Court for the District of Massachu-
setts since 1938. The proceedings were being held pursuant to Section 77 of
the Bankruptcy Act,3
 which provides for the reorganization of railroads
42 391 U.S. at 121-22 (dissenting opinion).
55 372 F.2d at 159.
Si 391 U.S, at 122 (dissenting opinion).
1 384 F.2d 819 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1003 (1968).
2 A reorganization involves a business plan for winding up the affairs of a bankrupt
corporation, in this case a railroad, by selling its property.
It is usually accomplished by the judicial sale of the corporate property and
franchises, and the formation by the purchasers of a new corporation. The prop-
erty and franchises are thereupon vested in the new corporation and its stock
and bonds are divided among such of the parties interested in the old company
as are parties to the reorganization plan.
Black's Law Dictionary 1462 (4th ed. 1968).
3 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1964).
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engaged in interstate commerce, if and when a railroad's petition of insolvency
is approved. Under section 77, it is the function of the Interstate Commerce
Commission to consider all proposed reorganization plans and to rule on them
accordingly. 4 After a reorganization plan has been approved by the ICC, it
is submitted to the bankruptcy court for the purpose of insuring that the
rights of creditors and stockholders of the debtor have been protected and
that certain other procedural requirements have been met.° Section 77 further
provides:
If the petition is so approved, the court in which the order is entered
shall, during the pendency of the proceedings under this section and
for the purposes thereof, have exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor
and its property wherever located . . . .° (Emphasis added.)
While this reorganization was taking place, the Commonwealth of Mas-
sachusetts sought to take by its power of eminent domain .' land owned in
fees by the Boston & Providence. The land in question consisted of a seven-
mile strip which the Commonwealth wanted for use as a highway. At the
time, this land had a railroad line running over it operated by the trustees
of the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad, a substantial creditor of
the Boston & Providence. The United States District Court for the District
of Massachusetts had approved a reorganization plan, subject to the ap-
proval of creditors and stockholders, whereby the land desired by the Com-
monwealth of. Massachusetts would be transferred to the New Haven Rail-
road .° To prevent this transfer from taking place the Commonwealth sought
a declaratory judgment that the consent of the ICC and the bankruptcy court
was not a jurisdictional prerequisite for taking the land by eminent domain.
While the case law dealing with this issue is somewhat sparse, the major-
ity of courts have interpreted the phrase "exclusive jurisdiction" in section
77 to require that before a state could take the land of a railroad undergoing
reorganization proceedings, it first had to obtain the consent of both the
ICC and the bankruptcy court having jurisdiction over the reorganization.
In light of these earlier decisions, the district court found that the authoriza-
tion and approval of the ICC and the bankruptcy court was a prerequisite
to the taking by the Commonwealth. 1° On appeal, the Commonwealth
conceded the fact that approval by the ICC was a prerequisite for
any taking. What the Commonwealth sought, however, was a determination
that, once ICC approval had been obtained, the consent of the bankruptcy
4 11 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1964).
5 11 U.S.C. § 205(e) (1964).
11 U.S.C. § 205(a) (1964).
7 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 160, § 7 (1958) provides that "[t]he commonwealth may,
at any time after one year's written notice to a railroad corporation, take its railroad, fran-
chise and other property by eminent domain under chapter seventy-nine." Chapter
79 sets out the statutory guidelines for the state's eminent domain power.
8 Land owned in fee is the "largest estate therein which [a] person may have." Black's
Law Dictionary 741 (4th ed. 1951).
9 The New Haven Railroad was also undergoing reorganization under Section 77 of
the Bankruptcy Act. The court having jurisdiction over the New Haven's reorganization
was the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut.
10 266 F. Supp. 390, 393 (D. Mass. 1967).
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court having "exclusive jurisdiction" under section 77 was not a jurisdictional
prerequisite for the Commonwealth in taking the railroad property by eminent
domain." On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
amending the lower court's ruling, HELD: The consent of the bankruptcy
court having "exclusive jurisdiction" over the reorganization proceedings of
an insolvent railroad is not a prerequisite for the taking by a state of that
railroad's property by eminent domain.' 2
In making its determination, the court of appeals decided that the phrase
"exclusive jurisdiction" was not meant to endow the bankruptcy court
with "exclusive jurisdiction" over each and every matter affecting the debtor's
property. The court found instead that the phrase "exclusive jurisdiction"
must be read in conjunction with the further wording of section 77, requiring
the "exclusive jurisdiction" of the court to be "during the pendency of the
proceedings and for the purposes thereof ."13 (Emphasis added.) In so doing,
the court held that a state's taking of railroad land by eminent domain is
not one of the "purposes" that Congress had intended to be within the
"exclusive jurisdiction" of the bankruptcy court.'" This determination directly
conflicts with earlier decisions in three other circuits.
In Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. City of Owatonna, 15 a railway was under-
going reorganization in accordance with Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act.
Part of the land owned by the railroad was situated in the city of Owatonna.
The city tried to condemn this land under the terms of its charter The Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stated the main issue in the case to be
whether the permission of the bankruptcy court was essential to a valid
condemnation. The court found that such consent was a jurisdictional pre-
requisite 1 6 It stated that once property was in the custody of the bankruptcy
court it could not be affected by proceedings in another court. 17
Similar reasoning was used by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Buckhannon & N.R.R. v. Davis.' 8 In this case, a receiver had been appointed
for the bankrupt Parkersburg Branch Railroad Company under the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1887." The Buckhannon and Northern Railroad Company
sought to initiate condemnation proceedings against the receiver as specified
by West Virginia law. The Buckhannon needed an easement to cross, at grade,
the right of way and roadbed of the Parkersburg at the point desired to be
condemned. The Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District
of West Virginia granted the Buckhannon permission to commence the suit
11 It is important to realize at this point the significance of this concession by the
Commonwealth. It conceded the fact that its power of eminent domain was not without
limitation. The sole issue facing the appellate court, therefore, was whether the Common-
wealth, after obtaining the approval of the Interstate Commerce Commission, also had to
obtain the consent of the bankruptcy court having jurisdiction over the reorganization.
12 384 F.2d at 822.
13 Id. at 820.
11 Id. at 822.
13 120 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1941).
16 Id. at 227.
12 Id.
18 135 F. 707 (4th Cir. 1905).
19 Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 3, 24 Stat. 554, and Act of Aug. 13, 1888, ch. 866,
25 Stat. 436, as cited in Buckhannon & N.R.R. v. Davis, 135 F. 707, 710 (4th Cir. 1905).
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against the receiver but did not stipulate the court in which the proceedings
should be initiated. The Buckhannon then notified the receiver that it would
apply to the state court to appoint commissioners to determine a fair com-
pensation to be paid to the Parkersburg. The receiver applied to the Circuit
Court of the United States for the Northern District of West Virginia to
restrain the Buckhannon from initiating the suit in the state court. The
federal court enjoined the Buckhannon from suing in the state court, holding
that condemnation proceedings must be instituted in the federal court having
jurisdiction over the bankrupt. 2°
A third case which conflicts with the holding in Bartlett is United States
v. Dorigan. 21
 This case involved a conflict between two federal laws, the
Bankruptcy Act and the Safety Appliance Act. 22 Under the Safety Appliance
Act, the United States Attorney was required to bring the suit for violation
of the Act in the district where the violation occurred.' Acting in accordance
with this requirement, the United States brought suit in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York against the New Haven
Railroad. At the time, the railroad was already in bankruptcy court under
Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act giving "exclusive jurisdiction" of all pro-
ceedings involving a railroad undergoing reorganization to the bankruptcy
court. Faced with the dilemma of two conflicting federal statutes, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York ruled that the
Government's failure to obtain the permission of the bankruptcy court was
a jurisdictional defect, and, unless the consent of the bankruptcy court was
obtained within sixty days, the complaint would be dismissed.'" Thus, the
court seemingly established the need for the bankruptcy court's consent before
any action could be brought against a railroad undergoing reorganization.
While the Bartlett decision is clearly in conflict with these previous cases,
it is submitted that Bartlett was correctly decided on its facts. The appellate
court in Bartlett cited Palmer v. Massachusetts25
 as authority for its holding.
Palmer also dealt with the New Haven Railroad which was undergoing re-
organization under section 77. The trustees, acting under the requirements
of Massachusetts law, 2° applied to the Massachusetts Department of Public
Utilities to abandon eighty-eight New Haven passenger stations. 27
 While
this application was pending, creditors of the New Haven petitioned the
bankruptcy court for an order directing the trustees to discontinue similar
services. The bankruptcy court held that section 77 gave it jurisdiction to
rule on the petition of the creditors and that the Massachusetts Department
of Public Utilities had no jurisdiction over the matter. 28 On appeal, the
20 135 F. at 711.
21 236 F. Supp. 106 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
22 45 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
23 45 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
24 236 F. Supp. at 109.
25 308 U.S. 79 (1939).
28 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 160, § 128 (1958).
27 The trustees applied to the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities rather
than to the Interstate Commerce Commission because the curtailment of these services was
considered purely an intrastate matter. Sec Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79, 84,
88 (1939).
28 308 U.S. at 83.
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United States Supreme Court held that just as the ICC is the federal ad-
ministrative body authorized to resolve questions of interstate abandonments,
so the state regulatory agency is the body empowered to determine intrastate
abandonments. 2" The importance of the Palmer case is that it establishes the
principle that the "exclusive jurisdiction" of the bankruptcy court is not
unlimited and that there exist certain areas where the bankruptcy court's
jurisdiction does not apply. If a state regulatory agency can, under certain
circumstances, pre-empt the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, there must
also be circumstances where the state's interest can similarly take precedence
over the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.
In reaching its decision, the Bartlett court relied principally on the
rationale of United States v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R. (New Haven)."
In the New Haven case, the court31 was faced with a conflict between the
"exclusive jurisdiction" phrase of the Bankruptcy Act and a federal statute
which said that condemnation of real estate by the United States was to be
brought in the district where the land was located. In making its determination,
the court construed section 77's phrase "for the purposes thereof" as limiting
the "exclusive jurisdiction" of the bankruptcy court. The court held that the
bankruptcy court had "exclusive jurisdiction" only over those matters which
go to the "purposes" of the proceedings.32 In speaking of these purposes, the
court said: "But it seems clear that the exclusivity of its (bankruptcy
court's) control is 'for the purposes (of the proceedings)' and its reach
should not be construed beyond the needs which the court has power to
fulfill."33 With this rationale, the New Haven court held that the condemna-
tion of real estate by the United States was not one of the "purposes" over
which the bankruptcy court has "exclusive jurisdiction." 34
The construction that the New Haven court gave to section 77 by inter-
preting the phrase "for the purposes thereof" as limiting the "exclusive
jurisdiction" of the bankruptcy court to those "needs which the court has
power to fulfill" was adopted by the Bartlett court in the present case. It
used the New Haven reasoning to hold that the state's taking of railroad
property was not one of the "purposes" over which the bankruptcy court
was meant to have "exclusive jurisdiction." 35
For the determination whether or not a state's condemnation of railroad
property is one of the "purposes" for which the bankruptcy court has "exclu-
sive jurisdiction," it is necessary to understand the purposes and the con-
sequences of a railroad reorganization. By establishing a special provision to
deal with the reorganization of interstate railroads, Congress evidenced an
awareness of the special situation presented by a bankrupt railroad. Unlike
the ordinary bankruptcy situation, a bankruptcy involving a railroad has the
additional effect of interrupting the flow of interstate commerce. Thus, in
29 Id. at 84, 89.
30 348 F.2d 151 (1st Cir. 1965).
31 It is interesting to note that this case, like Bartlett, was decided by the First Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals.
32 348 F.2d at 152.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 384 F.2d at 820-22.
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examining the reorganization of a railroad under section 77, it is important
to view the section in the context of the objectives set out by Congress
in the Interstate Commerce Act."
Under the Interstate Commerce Act, Congress sought to insure the smooth
and orderly flow of commerce among the various states. 31 To achieve this
objective it vested the Interstate Commerce Commission with the power of
enforcing the provisions of the Act. One such provision of the Act provides
that no railroad subject to its provisions "shall abandon all or any portion
of a line of railroad, or the operation thereof, unless and until there shall first
have been obtained from the Commission a certificate that the present or
future public convenience and necessity permit of such abandonment." 38 The
reason for such a requirement is obvious. Without this requirement voluntary
abandonment or an abandonment brought about by a state exercising its
eminent domain power could result in the eventual disruption of the entire
interstate network of railroad line.
This same danger to interstate commerce is even more prevalent in a
railroad insolvency proceeding where the various creditors and stockholders
of the debtor seek to participate in the distribution of the debtor's property.
Thus, to effectuate the objectives of the Interstate Commerce Act, Congress
passed Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act to insure that a railroad's insolvency
would not result in a distribution of property in any way that would interfere
with the flow of interstate commerce. To insure that the provisions of section
77 would be carried out in conformity with those of the Interstate Commerce
Act, the ICC was entrusted with the responsibility of approving all reorgan-
ization plans and of determining whether such plans were compatible with
the public interest.30 In the event that any property was to be abandoned
under a plan of reorganization, it was the task of the ICC to determine the
fair value of said property.4°
It is clear, therefore, that the ICC's function in a reorganization pro-
ceeding is to determine that course of action which will best carry out the
objectives of the Interstate Commerce Act in an unbroken flow of interstate
commerce. On the other hand, the function of the bankruptcy court in a
reorganization proceeding goes to an entirely different matter. It is the
bankruptcy court's function to protect the rights of the various creditors and
stockholders of the debtor and to make certain that the procedural require-
ments of section 77 have been met.41 After the ICC has approved the plan,
the bankruptcy court's only concern should be to see that the various creditors
and stockholders fairly participate in the distribution of property set out in
the plan.
In line with this reasoning, it is submitted that a state's taking of rail-
road property by eminent domain comes solely within the regulatory pre-
rogative of the ICC. Congress has vested the ICC with the responsibility
36 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
37 See "National Transportation Policy," preface to Interstate Commerce Act, 49
U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
38 49 U.S.C. § 1(18) (1964).
39 11 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1964).




of dealing with the abandonment of railroad property. If the ICC decides
that a state's taking of railroad property will not interfere with the public
interest in the flow of commerce, the fact that the railroad is also undergoing
reorganization should in no way affect this determination. After the ICC
determines the fair value of the land, the only concern of the bankruptcy court
should be to see that the money paid for the property is fairly distributed
among the creditors and stockholders. Therefore the Bartlett court correctly
found that a state's taking by eminent domain was not one of the "pur-
poses" for which the bankruptcy court has "exclusive jurisdiction."
Aside from the clear separation of powers between the bankruptcy court
and the Interstate Commerce Commission, there is an extremely strong public
interest that further supports the wisdom of the Bartlett holding. The Boston
& Providence had been undergoing reorganization proceedings under section
77 for twenty-nine years. To say that a state could be prohibited from taking
land vital to its interest for this long a period of time would be to subjugate
the interest of the public to that of a small group of private creditors and
stockholders. Further, in such a situation, the bankruptcy court is only post-
poning the taking because once the land in question came out of the reorgani-
zation proceedings, the state could take the land by applying to the ICC.
In the Bartlett case, there is an even stronger argument for not having to
obtain the bankruptcy court's consent. If the proposed reorganization plan of
the bankruptcy court to give the land in question to the New Haven were
approved, then the land would be under the "exclusive jurisdiction" of the
bankruptcy court in Connecticut where the New Haven was undergoing
reorganization. This outcome would mean that the Commonwealth would then
have to wait until the land came out of the Connecticut court, in further frus-
tration of the public need to build a highway. Such a result could not be
tolerated.
A state's right of eminent domain is within the sovereign power of the
state and, if accompanied by just compensation, needs no other justification.42
In the case of a taking of an interstate railroad, if the ICC, the agency
vested with the responsibility of insuring the orderly passage of interstate
carriers, allows the taking, the bankruptcy court, not concerned with these
matters, should not be permitted to rule against the public interest. The only
matter properly remaining for the consideration of that court is the correct
distribution of the compensation paid by the state. It is to this purpose that
"exclusive jurisdiction" of the bankruptcy court should apply. Such a limited
jurisdiction appears especially wise when it accommodates the power of the
state to carry out projects of public need.
MARI< P. HARMON
42 1 P. Nichols, The Law of Eminent Domain § 1.13(4) (3d rev. ed. J. L. Sackman
1964).
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